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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Appellate jurisdiction over this case is rested in the Utah
Court

of Appeals pursuant to Section 78-2a-3 (2) (d) , Utah Code

Annotated 1953, as amended.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
The City accepts the statement of appellant.
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS,
STATUTES, ORDINANCE, AND RULES
Fifth Amendment, United States Constitution
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or
indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in
the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in
actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall
any person be subject for the same offence to be twice
put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled
in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor
be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor shall private property be taken for
public use, without just compensation.
Article I Section 12, Constitution of Utah
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right
to appear and defend in person and by counsel, to demand
the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to
have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to
1

have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the
county or district in which the offense is alleged
have

been

committed,

and

the

right

to

appeal

in

to
all

cases. In no instance shall any accused person, before
final judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees to
secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused

shall

not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife
shall not be compelled to testify against her husband,
nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any person be
twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.
(Second paragraph omitted)
§ 76-1-403, Utah Code Annotated
§

76-1-403.

Former

prosecution

barring

subsequent

prosecution for offense out of same episode.
(1)

If

a

defendant

has

been

prosecuted

for

one

or

more

offenses arising out of a single criminal episode, a subsequent
prosecution for the same or a different offense arising out of the
same criminal episode is barred if:
(a) The subsequent prosecution is for an offense that was
or should have been tried under Subsection 76-1-402(2) in
the former prosecution; and
(b) The former prosecution:
(i) resulted in acquittal; or
(ii) resulted in conviction; or

2

(iii) was improperly terminated; or
(iv) was terminated by a final order or

judgment

for the defendant that has not been reversed,
set

aside,

or

vacated

and

that

necessarily

required a determination inconsistent with a
fact

that

must

be

established

to

secure

conviction in the subsequent prosecution.
(2)

(Omitted)

(3) (Omitted)
(4) There is an improper termination of prosecution if the
termination

takes place before

the verdict, is for reasons

not

amounting to an acquittal, and takes place after a jury has been
impanelled and sworn to try the defendant, or, if the jury trial is
waived, after the first witness is sworn. However, termination of
prosecution is not improper if:
(a) The defendant consents to the termination; or
(b) The

defendant

waives

his

right

to

object

to

the

termination;
(c) the court finds and states for the record that the
termination is necessary because:
(i) It is physically impossible to proceed with the
trial in conformity with the law; or
(ii) there is a legal defect in the proceeding not
attributable

to

the

3

state

that

would

make

any

judgment entered upon a verdict reversible as a
matter of law; or
(iii)

Prejudicial

conduct

in

or

out

of

the

courtroom not attributable to the state makes it
impossible

to

proceed

with

the

trial

without

injustice to the defendant or the state; or
(iv) the jury is unable to agree upon a verdict; or
(v)

False

statements

of

a

juror

on

voir

dire

prevent a fair trail.
Utah Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3, Utah Code of Judicial
Administration Chapter 12 (relevant portions)
Canon 3. A judge shall perform the duties of the office
impartially and diligently.
E.

Disqualification
(1) A judge shall enter a disqualification in
a proceeding in which the judge's impartiality
might reasonably be questioned, including but
not limited to instances where:
(a) the

judge has

a personal

bias or

prejudice concerning a party or a party's
lawyer, a strong personal bias involving
an issue in a case, or personal knowledge
of disputed evidentiary facts concerning
the proceeding;

4

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The City accepts the statement of the appellant.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
1. The defendant Randy Patten was charged with violation of a
protective order, § 76-5-108, Utah Code Annotated, which is a Class
A Misdemeanor. The prosecution was commenced by the filing of three
separate

informations

on

or

about

February

28,

1997

(case

#971000887, case #971000888, and case #971000889). Record, P. 1,
45.
2. On or about June 23, 1997, a bench trial was conducted
before the Honorable Judge Ronald Nehring. The trial encompassed
all three charges, which had been consolidated. Record, P. 56.
3. Upon commencement of the trial, witnesses were sworn and
testified on behalf of the prosecution. Record, P. 179
4. During the testimony of Randy Patten's wife, Susan Patten,
the alleged victim, it came to the attention of the Court that
Susan Patten was being represented in her divorce action against
Randy

Patten

by

the

wife

of

an

assistant

West

Valley

City

prosecutor. Transcript, P. 42-45
5. When this issue arose during the questioning

of Susan

Patten, Judge Nehring declared a recess. Transcript, P. 45. During
the recess, Judge Nehring spoke with the attorneys in his chambers.
Record, P. 172.
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6. Following the recess, Judge Nehring declared a mistrial.
Judge's

Ruling,

P.

2. He

also

announced

that

he

was

going

to

reassign the case to another judge since, during the discussions,
he had

learned

information

about the case which was beyond

the

information presented by the witnesses and beyond the record in the
case.

Judge

Nehring

announced

that,

"In my

view, my

continued

involvement on this case would be inappropriate." Judge's Ruling,
P. 3.
7.

On

November

dismiss

on

double

3,

1997,

jeopardy

the

and

defendant
improper

filed

a motion

termination

to

grounds.

Record, P. 169. The defendant's motion was heard at oral argument
by the Honorable Judge Judith S.H. Atherton on January 26, 1998.
Record, P. 171.
8. On March 18, 1998, Judge Atherton denied the defendant's
motion by Memorandum

Decision wherein

she found Judge

Nehring's

recusal from the case constituted a clear and compelling reason for
a mistrial and that retrial of the defendant was not barred by the
principles of double jeopardy. Record, P. 172.

6

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
I•

a.

JUDGE ATHERTON CORRECTLY RULED THAT JUDGE
NEHRING'S DECLARATION OF A MISTRIAL IN
THIS CASE WAS NOT IMPROPER AND THAT THE
REPROSECUTION OF RANDY PATTEN IS NOT
BARRED BY THE PROHIBITION AGAINST DOUBLE
JEOPARDY.

Thexmanifest necessity' mistrial exception to double jeopardy
and the statutory exception in §76-1-403, Utah Code Annotated.
The United States and Utah Constitutions bar retrial following

a declaration of mistrial unless the mistrial was declared based
upon a ^manifest necessity.'

This concept has been codified in

Utah as §76-1-403 Utah Code Annotated.
b.

Judge Nehring' s recusal and reassignment of the case is
^manifest necessity' for a mistrial and falls within the
exceptions contained in §76-1-403, Utah Code Annotated.
Judge Atherton

correctly

determined

and

ruled

that

Judge

Nehring's declaration of a mistrial in this case was not a bar to
retrial on grounds of double jeopardy. Although the parties argued
other grounds for the mistrial, Judge Atherton held that Judge
Nehring' s recusal on the grounds that he had been privy to too much
information about the case was a basis for finding that retrial was
not barred by §76-1-403, Utah Code Annotated. Furthermore, the
midtrial, sua sponte,

recusal of a judge for bias or potential bias

is required by the Utah Code of Judicial Conduct and falls squarely

7

within the ^manifest necessity' exception to the double jeopardy
provisions.
Also, since the trial judge is the person who is in the best
position to judge his own potential bias or the appearance of bias
on

his

part,

his

decision

to

recuse

should

be

given

great

deference.
c.

The trial courts failure to use the phase xlegal necessity' or
^manifest necessity' in it's rulings does not affect the
correctness of Judge Atherton's decision.
The trial courts failure to use the correct legal terminology

in reaching their decisions is not a fatal error, since an adequate
basis for finding ^manifest necessity' can be found in the record.

DETAIL OF THE ARGUMENTS
I.

a.

JUDGE ATHERTON CORRECTLY RULED THAT JUDGE
NEHRING'S DECLARATION OF A MISTRIAL IN
THIS CASE WAS NOT IMPROPER AND THAT THE
REPROSECUTION OF RANDY PATTEN IS NOT
BARRED BY THE PROHIBITION AGAINST DOUBLE
JEOPARDY.

The^manifest necessity' mistrial exception to double jeopardy
and the statutory exception in §76-1-403, Utah Code Annotated.
This case is an appeal of the Memorandum Ruling of Judge

Atherton denying the Defendant Randy Patten's ("Patten") motion to
dismiss all charges on the grounds of double jeopardy. A thorough
examination of the case law indicates that Judge Atherton's ruling

8

was correct and that, based upon the information found in the
record, a mistrial in this case was a manifest necessity.
The analysis found in Patten's brief regarding the doctrine of
double jeopardy is accurate. In the case of bar, West Valley City
("City") agrees that since this was a bench trial and a witness had
been sworn, that jeopardy had attached. The City also agrees that
Patten did not consent to the termination of the trial, nor did he
waive his right to object to the termination of the trial. Under
circumstances such as this, the double jeopardy clauses of both the
Fifth Amendment, United States Constitution, and Article 1, Section
12, Utah State Constitution, bar retrial of the defendant unless
the

mistrial

was

based

upon

circumstances

that

amount

to a

^manifest necessity'. As Judge Atherton correctly concluded, such
manifest necessity is apparent in this case.
The original standard for an exception to double jeopardy for
a mistrial based upon a ^manifest necessity' was set forth by the
United States Supreme Court in United

States

v.

Perez,

22 U.S. 579

(1824). In Utah, the doctrine of double jeopardy and its exceptions
have been codified at Section 76-1-403, Utah Code Annotated.
v.

Nilson,
Utah

State

854 P.2d 1029 (Utah App. 1993).
Courts

have

consistently

recognized

that

the double

jeopardy provisions do not bar retrial when a mistrial has been
declared for reasons of manifest necessity. Many Utah courts, have
used the phrase

x

legal necessity,' rather than the more common

9

phrase

^manifest necessity, ' however, it is clear that the terms

are synonymous. State
b.

v.

Ambrose,

598 P.2d 354

(Utah 1979).

Judge Nehring's recusal and reassignment of the case is
^manifest necessity' for a mistrial and falls within the
exceptions contained in §76-1-403, Utah Code Annotated.
A close examination of the Memorandum Decision issued by Judge

Atherton on March 18, 1998, indicates that her decision was based
solely

on

Judge

Nehring's

decision

to

recuse

himself.

Judge

Atherton held that:
The basis of the judge's reassignment of the case to
another judge is a clear and compelling basis for
declaring
a mistrial
under
Section
U.C.A.
76-1403(4) (c) (iii) (Supp.1997), ^prejudicial conduct in or
out of the court room not attributable to the state,
mak[ing] it impossible to proceed with the trial without
injustice to the defendant or state'.
Record, p. 173.
The Utah Code section referred to above by Judge Atherton is
a specific statutory exception to the bar against retrial and is
analogous

to the

constitutional
stated

that

^manifest necessity' mistrial

double

since

the

jeopardy
record

provisions.
supported

exception to the

Judge

the

Atherton

declaration

also
of

a

mistrial based upon Judge Nehring's recusal, she need not address
other arguments. Since it is Judge Atherton's Memorandum Decision
which is the subject of this appeal, it is appropriate to closely
examine

the basis

for that decision,

decision to recuse himself.

10

which

was

Judge

Nehring's

While there appears to be no Utah case law directly on point,
the relationship between a judge's decision to recuse himself and
the double jeopardy bar against reprosecution has been examined by
several other jurisdictions. Those courts have been very clear that
the midtrial recusal of a judge constitutes ^manifest necessity'
for purposes of the mistrial exception to the double jeopardy rule.
In this case, Judge Nehring was faced with the appearance of
an impropriety

when

it was discovered

that a key prosecution

witness was being represented in her divorce action against Patten
by the wife of an assistant West Valley City Prosecutor. When this
issue arose during the questioning of the witness, Judge Nehring
declared a recess. Transcript, p. 42-45. During the recess, Judge
Nehring spoke with the attorneys in his chambers. Record, p. 172.
Apparently, it was during this discussion that Judge Nehring became
privy to additional information about the case beyond that which
had been entered into evidence. The court docket states

xx

Judge

Nehring recused himself based on discussions of resolution as Court
was trying to solve the issue of conflict of interest." Record
p.179-180. Following the recess, Judge Nehring declared a mistrial.
Among the statements Judge Nehring placed on the record when
declaring the mistrial was the following:
I am going to reassign the case because I have
participated in discussions of possible resolutions to
the case, I know a considerable amount about this case
beyond what I have heard from witnesses and beyond what's
on the record in the case. And in my view, my continuing
involvement in this case would be inappropriate...

11

Judge's Ruling, p. 3.
This is the portion of the record supporting Judge Nehring's
recusal that is referred to by Judge Atherton in her Memorandum
Decision denying Patten's motion to dismiss on grounds of double
jeopardy.
As did Judge Atherton, many Courts have determined that a
trial judge's recusal is a valid reason for mistrial. The case of
State

v.

example

Graham,

960 P.2d 457 (Wash. App. Div. 2 1998), is a good

of how a judge's decision to recuse himself

has been

addressed by other courts in relation to the bar against double
jeopardy. In Graham,
mischief.

During

the defendant had been charged with malicious

the

course

of

the

trial, the pro

tern

judge

realized that he may have a conflict of interest since a police
officer from a town for which the Judge acted as City Attorney
would be testifying. The judge in the Graham case recused himself
and explained his reasons as follows:
The Code of Judicial Conduct rule 3(d) (1)
requires me to disqualify myself because I
think it could reasonably be expected that my
impartiality could be questioned. Frankly, it
wouldn't, but the point is it could be
reasonably be expected because South Bend is
my client, on-going client, so I don't think I
have any choice.
State

v.

Graham,

at Page 458.

Utah has a similar section in its Code of Judicial Conduct
which is found at Canon 3(E) (1, which states: XNA judge shall enter
a

disqualification

in

a

proceeding
12

in

which

the

judge's

impartiality

might

reasonably

be

questioned..."

Utah

Code

of

Judicial Conduct, Canon 3.
The Washington Court of Appeals decision in the Graham case
stated:
We hold that where the judge correctly decides
that he must recuse himself, and there is no
evidence of bad faith conduct by the judge, a
manifest necessity exists for his recusal. We
hold that the judge in this case did not abuse
his discretion in finding a manifest necessity
and, therefore, Graham's second trial was not
barred by the constitutional prohibition
against double jeopardy.
State

v. Graham,

at Page 458.

In the case at bar, Judge Nehring stated that "...in my view
my continued involvement on this case would be inappropriate..."
Judge's Ruling p. 3. There is no indication from the record that
bad

faith

played

any

role

in

Judge

Nehring's

decision.

He

apparently believed that his exposure to additional information
about the case either raised a question as to his impartiality or,
perhaps created a doubt in his own mind about his ability to be
impartial. Because only Judge Nehring can truly gauge such factors,
his decision to recuse himself should be accorded great deference.
The Court of Appeals of Georgia, in Bailey

v.

State,

465 S.E.2d 284

(Ga. App. 1995) stated:
We agree that where the decision for declaring
a mistrial is bias on the part of the fact
finder, the trial court's decision to declare
a mistrial is entitled
to the highest
deference. Although we have held that the
trial
court must consider
less
drastic
13

alternatives prior to declaring a mistrial,
there appear to be no alternatives for the
trial judge to consider in this situation.
Therefore, we find that, in this instance, the
trial judge's inability to disregard evidence
he ruled inadmissable constitutes a manifest
necessity for mistrial. Accordingly, Bailey's
double jeopardy rights will not be violated by
a retrial to a jury. (Citations omitted)

Bailey

v. State,

at 286.

In an analogous case from Pennsylvania, the Superior Court of
Pennsylvania reviewed a situation in which the trial court judge
and the defense counsel had an argument during the course of the
bench

trial. The

trial

judge

admitted

that

he had

adopted

a

"'personal, condemnatory opinion of the entire defense approach and
strategy" and sua sponte

recused himself and declared a mistrial.

Commonwealth

112 A.2d 332(Pa. Super. Ct. 1998).

v.

In Leister,

Leister,

the Pennsylvania court stated that the reviewing

Court should not use a mechanical formula in determining whether a
trial court had a manifest need to declare a mistrial.
v.

Leister,

at 335. Similarly, the Utah Supreme Court has declined

to "lay down specific rules in this area."
359.

Commonwealth

The Leister

State

v. Ambrose,

at p.

court relied on the United States Supreme Court

case of Wade v. Hunter,

336 U.S. 684, 69 S.Ct. 384, 93L.Ed 974

(1949), in stating "Far more conversant with the factors relevant
to the determination than any reviewing court can possibly be, the
trial judge, who is the foremost authority in his or her courtroom,

14

is usually best positioned to determine the necessity of recusal in
any individual case."

Commonwealth

v.

Leister,

at 335.

The court then went on to state that, "When judges doubt their
own

ability

to

adjudicate

impartially,

they

should

recuse

themselves. Such an inability to be objective creates a manifest
necessity for the declaration of a mistrial, particularly when a
judge must exert the broad discretion that a bench trial demands."
(Citations omitted) Commonwealth

v.

Leister,

at 335.

In another Pennsylvania case, the trial court judge realized
during trial that he had a great familiarity with many of the
people involved in the case. He stated, "Now I frankly question my
ability to be objective in this case and would feel better that the
matter be submitted to a petit jury." Commonwealth
A.2d 888 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983) In the Smith

v.

Smith,

467

case, the Superior Court

of Pennsylvania agreed with the trial court's decision by stating:
"Discovery by the sitting judge during a trial
that a member or members of the jury were
biased pro or con one side has been held to
warrant discharge of the jury and direction of
a new trial." In appellant's case, the trial
judge sitting as the fact finder recognized
that he had a bias and on that basis ruled a
mistrial. In a situation such as this, a
mistrial clearly was a ^manifest necessity'
and thus a new trial would not violate
appellant's double jeopardy rights.
Commonwealth
v. Smith,
at 891, [quoting Downum v United
U.S. 734, 83 S.Ct 1033, 10 L.Ed 2d 100(1963)]

States

372

Although there are no similar recusal/double jeopardy cases in
Utah, the Utah Supreme Court has provided
15

an opinion as to a

judge's

obligation

to

recuse

Judicial Conduct. In State

himself

v. Neeley,

under

the

Utah

Code

of

748 P.2d 1091 (Utah 1988),

the Court stated,
However, a judge should
recuse himself when
his
"impartiality'
might
reasonably
be
questioned. Utah Code of Judicial Conduct
3(C)(1)(b) (1981).This standard set forth by
the Code of Judicial Conduct should be given
careful consideration by the trial judge. It
may require recusal in instances where no
actual bias is shown. (Emphasis in original)
State

v.

Neeley,

p. 1094.

The Utah Supreme Court also stated in Neeley
not withdraw
occasions

from the stand this court has taken on previous

that the integrity of the judicial

protected against any taint of suspicion."
See also,

1094.

(1948).

See

that: "... we do

also,

Haslam
In

v. Morrison,
the

Interest

system should be

State

v.

Neeley,

p.

113 Utah 14, 190 P.2d 520
of

Morrow,

583 A.2d 816, 819

(Pa. Super. Ct. 1990). ("When a judge "believes his impartiality
can be reasonably questioned,' he should recuse himself, just as he
should

if he himself

has doubt

as to his ability

to preside

impartially.")
Another approach to this problem was used by the Supreme Court
of Michigan.

In People

v. Hicks.

528 N.W.2d 136 (Mich. 1994), the

court found that the midtrial recusal of a trial judge is analogous
to the situation created by the midtrial disability of a judge. In
Hicks,

the court determined that since the successor judge could

not proceed in any manner acceptable to the parties, the recusal of
16

the original judge constituted manifest necessity for a mistrial
and,

therefore,

retrial

was

not

barred

by

double

jeopardy

principles.
Finally, the state of the law in this area has been set forth
in some detail by the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit. In United

States

888 F.2d 732 (11th CIR.

v. Kelly,

1989), the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed a case in
which the trial court judge discovered that the wife of a witness
was a close personal friend of the judge's wife. Also, prior to
realizing that she was the wife of a witness, the judge had a
conversation with the woman in his chambers during a recess. After
sua

sponte

raising the issue of recusal, the trial court judge

decided not to recuse himself but to continue with the trial. It
was clear from the record that he did not recuse himself because he
was afraid a retrial would be barred by double jeopardy principles.
Based upon those facts, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
determined that the trial courts judge's decision to not recuse
himself from a bench trial constituted reversible error. The Court
stated that Federal judges are governed by 28 U.S.C.A. Section 455
which provides, among other things, that a judge "shall disqualify
himself

in

reasonably
virtually
Conduct,

any
be

proceeding

questioned."

identical
which

in
That

to Canon

governs

which

judges

3

his

phrase
(E)(1),

in Utah.
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impartiality

from
Utah

Section
Code of

Federal

might
455

is

Judicial

judges, under

Section 455, are required to resolve any doubts they may have in
favor of disqualification. United
(11th CIR. 1987),
In
concerns

a

v.

Alabama,

824 F.2d 1532

(Cert, denied sub nom) .

lengthy
about

States

footnote

double

addressing

jeopardy,

the

the

Kelly

Eleventh

trial

Circuit

Appeals stated,
Contrary to the judge's concerns, retrial
would probably not have been barred in this
case. Because this issue may recur in future
cases, we find it appropriate to express our
view that sua sponte
recusal, when properly
exercised according to any of the requirements
of
section
455,
constitutes
'manifest
necessity' for declaring a mistrial under
Arizona
v. Washington,
434 U.S. 497, 54 L. Ed.
2d 717, 98 S. Ct. 824 (1978) .
It has long been established that retrial
is barred
by
double
jeopardy
principles
following
a
mistrial
declared
over
the
objections of the defendant, absent a showing
of
'manifest
necessity.'
See
Oregon
v.
Kennedy,
456 U.S. 667, 672, 72L.Ed.2d 416, 102
S. Ct. 2083 (1982); cf. Id. (Retrial normally
allowed where mistrial is 'declared at the
behest of the defendant'). In Arizona
v.
Washington,
the Supreme Court held that a
trial judge's declaration of mistrial because
of prejudicial comments made to the jury by
defense
counsel
satisfied
the
'manifest
necessity' standard. The Court held: 'In a
strict, literal sense, the mistrial was not
'necessary.'
nevertheless,
the
overriding
interest in the evenhanded administration of
justice requires that we accord the highest
degree
of
respect
to
the
trial
judge's
evaluation
of
the
likelihood
that
the
impartiality of one of more jurors may have
been affected by the improper comment.' 434
U.S. at 511; see also id. At 513-14 (noting
that judge's firsthand familiarity with the
trial
'[militates]
in favor of
appellate
18

court's
Court

of

deference
to
[his]
evaluation
of
the
significance of possible bias'). Accord Abdi
v. Georgia,
744 F.2d 1500, 1503 (11th Cir.
1984), cert, denied, 471 U.S. 106, 85 L. Ed.
2d 164, 105 S. Ct. 1871 (1985); see also
United States
v. Cousins,
842 F.2d 1245, 1247
(11th Cir.), cert, denied, 488 U.S. 853, 109 S.
Ct. 139, 102 L. Ed. 2d 111 (1988) (grant of
mistrial based on possible jury prejudice
^largely within the discretion of the district
court') .
These considerations apply even more
strongly to the case at bar, which involves a
judge acting as sole fact finder in a bench
trial. The Court in Arizona
v. Washington
held
that because the judge in that case exercised
^sound discretion'..., the mistrial order is
supported by the Ahigh degree' of necessity
which is required in a case of this kind.' Id.
At 516. We hold, therefore, that where a trial
judge properly exercises his discretion to
recuse himself under section 455, ^manifest
necessity' is established for any resulting
mistrial.
United

States
Based

correctly
himself

of America
on the

Kelly,

foregoing,

determined

was

v.

that

sufficient

Footnote 24.

it is clear

Judge

Nehring's

reason to declare

that Judge
decision
a mistrial

Atherton
to

recuse

and

that

retrial of Patten would not be a violation of double jeopardy
principles.
c.

The trial courts failure to use the phase xlegal necessity' or
^manifest necessity' in it's rulings does not affect the
correctness of Judge Atherton's decision.
Patten was concerned in his brief that neither Judge Nehring

nor Judge Atherton used the phrase

^manifest necessity' or the

common Utah phrase "legal necessity" in making their respective
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rulings.

That omission is not a terminal defect that bears on the

correctness of their decisions. Explicit findings on the presence
of manifest necessity are not necessary as long as a basis can be
found in the record.
In Arizona

v. Washington,

434 U.S. 497, 98 S. Ct. 824, 54 L.

Ed. 2d 717 (1978), the United States Supreme Court addressed that
specific issue in a case involving improper statements made to a
jury

during

opening

argument. The

Supreme

Court

reversed

the

rulings of the United States District Court and the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals and stated:
One final matter requires consideration.
The absence of an explicit
finding of
^manifest necessity' appears to have been
determinative for the District Court and may
have been so for the Court of Appeals. If
those
courts
regarded
that
omission
as
critical, they required too much. Since the
record provides sufficient justification for
the state-court ruling, the failure to explain
that ruling more completely does not render it
constitutionally defective. (Footnote omitted)
Arizona

v. Washington,

434 U.S., at p.516-517.

The Supreme Court went on to state:
The
state
trial
judge's
mistrial
declaration is not subject to collateral
attack in a federal court simply because he
failed to find ^manifest necessity' in those
words or to articulate on the record all the
factors which informed the deliberate exercise
of his discretion.

Arizona
Callaway

v. Washington
434 U.S., at p. 517; see also, State
787 P.2d 1247 (N. M. App. 1989).
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v.

Judge Atherton's decision is correct, despite the fact that
neither Judge Nehring nor Judge Atherton used the phrase ^manifest
necessity' in their rulings.

Pursuant to §76-1-403(4)(c), the

trial judge is required to state on the record the reasons for
mistrial. Judge Nehring's comments on the record regarding his
knowledge of the case and the inappropriateness of him hearing the
case

meet

according

that

standard

and

constitute

to the relevant case law.

^manifest

Judge Atherton

necessity'
correctly

recognized this, even though the parties were presenting other
arguments which she chose not to address.
In this case, the only person who could make the decision as
to what effect the additional information may have on the fairness
of

the

bench

trial

was

Judge

Nehring.

To

second

guess

his

decision, and bar retrial based upon double jeopardy, has the
potential to put trial courts in the extremely awkward position
that the judge in the Kelly

case found himself.

In situations

where there is actual, potential, or the appearance of bias on the
part of the trial court, the judge will be faced with the dilemma
of deciding to follow the Canons of the Utah Code of Judicial
Conduct and recuse himself, thereby risking a double jeopardy bar
to retrial; or continuing with the trial, thereby risking violating
the Utah Code of Judicial Conduct and potentially the fairness of
the trial.

Also, the failure to observe the Canon and recuse when

appropriate may result in disciplinary action against the judge.
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State

v.

Neeley,

supra, at p. 1094.

admonition in Neeley,
*impartiality'

If the Supreme

that "a judge should

might

reasonably

be

Court's

recuse himself when his

questioned''

(emphasis

in

original) is to be followed by the trial courts of this state, then
the trial court judge should be given the deference to determine
when such recusal is appropriate. State

v. Neeley,

at p. 1094.

It

also follows that a mistrial cause by the recusal of the trial
court judge for reasons of actual, potential or the appearance of
bias must fit squarely within the ^manifest necessity' exception to
the double jeopardy bar against retrial and the exception contained
in

§76-1-403 (4) (c) (iii)

Utah

Code

Annotated,

its

state

law

corollary.
CONCLUSION
Based

on the

foregoing, it is clear

that

Judge

Atherton

correctly determined and ruled that Judge Nehring's declaration of
a mistrial in this case was not a bar to retrial on grounds of
double jeopardy. Although the parties argued other grounds for the
mistrial, Judge Atherton held that Judge Nehring's recusal on the
grounds that he had been privy to too much information about the
case was a basis for finding that retrial was not barred by Section
76-1-403, Utah Code Annotated.

Also, the midtrial, sua

sponte,

recusal of a judge for bias or potential bias is required by the
Utah

Code

of

Judicial

Conduct

and
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falls

squarely

within

the

^manifest necessity' exception to the double jeopardy provisions of
the United States and Utah Constitutions.
Judge Atherton's Memorandum Decision should be affirmed and
Patten's appeal should be dismissed.

rtH
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